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Abstract
This paper examines the commercial loan decision process from the perspec
tive of the individual loan officer. An analysis of this process concerns the
relative effects of various criteria on the loan application and the degree to
which tradeoffs are made among them by the loan officer. A basic theory of the
process is first developed. The model is then empirically tested using a set of
factorially designed combinations of these variables. This format avoids sev
eral of the problems previously encountered when the lending process has been
empirically examined. The model not only exhibits a high degree of explanatory
power but also permits important insights into this process.
The Commercial Lending Decision: A Multlattribute Analysis
Research on the commercial lending decision has had two primary focuses.
Considerable study has been made of the role of the lending component in broader
bank portfolio allocation models (Campbell [7], Deshmukh, Greenbaum, and Kanatas
111], Harris [15,16], Hester [18], Luckett [25], Sealey [28]. An additional
major thrust has been the delineation of loan pricing vectors (Bartter and
Rendleman [5], Campbell and Brendsel [8], Hawkins [17], James [20], Kolodny,
Sealey and Polakoff [23]). Despite the extensive theoretical development in
both areas, empirical examination of the lending process has exhibited distinct
limitations. First, there has been a survival bias in that, by relying on pub
lished results, only granted loans are examined. Second, with the exception of
Luckett [25], the reliance on Federal Reserve survey results (Harris [15,16],
Hester [18], James [20]) limits the analysis to principally large money center
banks that report such data.
In contrast to previous research utilizing aggregate bank portfolio models,
this study examines the loan decision from the viewpoint of the individual bank
lending officers when faced with multiple decision variables in the loan deci
sion. Previous research on loan pricing together with the credit rationing
literature ([14],[15],[25]) suggests that the Interest rate is only one element
among a more complete set of decision variables. Section 11 develops a theoret
ical construct for an expanded set of decision variables. Section III describes
how this set of variables is tested, based on a sample of hypothetical loans
generated from a set of factorially designed combinations of the decision
variables. Section IV presents the results of the empirical testing.
2II. Basic Theory
This paper studies the determinants of lenders* ranking of loans. Since
the loan size Is controlled, the discussion will focus on the loan of a dollar.
By suitable scaling, the discussion will apply to any pool of loan applications,
each for A dollars. The loan features examined in this study are: collateral,
yield, management, repayment ability, market conditions, and loan purpose.
Denote by c the collateral on the loan, and by r, the yield. Let x be the
cash payments from the borrower to the lender over the period of the loan. Then
the return to the lender, R, can take either one of two forms. First, the loan
does not perform, in which case the lender gets the collateral plus whatever
cash payments, x, occur prior to default. Otherwise, the loan performs, and the
lender gets back his principal 1 and interest r. Thus, the return function for
the lender, R(x), equals the minimum of c + x and 1, + r. This is depicted in
Figure 1. Note the crucial value ofx=l+r-c;at this value, a loan is
just on the verge of performing.
Now if X were certain it would be an easy matter for the bank to rank
loans: good loans perform, bad loans do not. In most cases, however, x is
random. Indeed, the randomness of x Is typically contingent on the -remaining
four features: management, the borrowing firm's repayment ability, market
conditions, and loan purpose.
•Let = management capability of the borrowing firm; = repayment
ability of the borrower; = market conditions facing the borrower; = com
pliance of the loan with the lender's loan policy. The conditional probability
relationship for x given levels of the z' will be denoted by f(x/z.,z-,z-,z.).
A ^ ij ^
The z*s are measured in such a way that an increase in any z should shift the
Figure 1
Figure 2
Loan Return Function
1+r-c
Conditional Probability of x given z
a) f(x/2) b) f(x/2 )
z *>z
R(x) = iiiin(x+c,l+r)
l+r-c ^max
4conditional probability to the right. Better management» for instance, should
raise the probability that a loan will perform. This is depircted in Figure 2.
To avoid trivialities, we assume that there is always some probability of
non-performance. Denoting by the cumulative probability
distribution, then, yZ^^0.
To simplify the notation, let Z represent the vector consisting of the 4
z's. If Z* Is greater than Z in at least one component, and at least as great
as Z in all components, then F(x/Z)<F(x/Z*), where F is the cumulative condi
tional probability function. For example, in Figure 2, F(xq/Z) is positive,
while' F(xq/Z*) is zero.
Finally, the attitude of the lender towards risk must be considered.
If the lender's utility function is linear, U(R) = R for return R, then the
lender is risk-neutral. On the other hand, if the lender's utility function
is strictly concave, U(R) exhibits positive but diminishing marginal utility,
and the lender is risk-averse. We will exclude the possibility of risk-seeking
lenders. Then the expected utility of the lender is given by
EU(R/z) = J U(R)f(x/Z)dx (1)
0
Note that the lender's expected utility depends on all 6 factors. It is
explicitly conditional on Z, and implicitly dependent on c and r, as the
following rewriting of (1) shows:
1+r-c 00
EU(R/Z) = / U(x+c)f(x/Z)dx + J U(l-H:)f(x/z)dx (2)
0 1+r-c
For a risk-neutral lender, (2) becomes
1+r-c ®
E(R/Z) = / (c+x)f (x/Z)dx + / (l+r)f (x/Z)dx
0 1+r-c (3)
1+r-c
= cF(l+r-c/Z) + / xf(x/Z)dp + (1+r)[l-F(l+r-c/Z)]
0
The first term on the right-hand side of (3) is the expected value of the
collateral, that is, the collateral times the probability of collecting the
collateral when the loan does not perform. The second term is the expected
default value of the project, given that the project does not perform as a
loan and hence the lender collects all the proceeds prior to default. The
third term is the expected value of the loan, given that it does perform,
that la the principal plus interest times the probability of receiving them.
A similar interpretation applies to a risk-averse lender also:
1+r-c "
EU(R/Z) = / U(c-bc)f(x/Z)dx + U(l+r) / f(x/Z)dx = W
0 1+r-c
l+r-c
/ U(c+x)f<x/Z)dx + U(l+r)[l-F(14T-c/Z)]
0
The first term is the expected utility in the non-performance zone; the second,
the expected utility of performance.
Mathematically we can show that Increases in any of the 6 features
Increase the expected return to the lender; that Is
9EU(R/z) . ^^^ > 0 for y^ = c, r, z^. z^, z^. (5)
(5) is verified in the appendix.
This can be illustrated using the following special case. Let f(x/Z) be a
uniform density, and only changes in a single one of the z's are considered.
In particular
f(x/z) - for z < X < 1+a+z,
1+a — —
0 otherwise.
Then F(x/z) =0 for x < z
^-7^ for z < x < 1+a+z
1+a — —
1 for 1+a+z < X.
Computing the expected return according to (3), we have
1+r-c
eu(r) =c . J ^ dx + (1- (1^) = (6)
Z
(1-h:)^ - (z+c)^ + (i_ 1+c-c-z
• 2(l+a) ^ 1+a ^
Taking derivatives with respect to c, r, and z, we have
9EU(R) ^ 1+r-c-z . ^
tic 1+a
8EU(R) _ a4c+z-r ^ ^
3r ° 1+a
9EU(R). l-hr-c-z
9z ° 1+a •
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thus verifying (5) in this case*
III. Methodology
As specified in Section II, the loan officer examines multiple attributes
of a potential loan. In this evaluation process, the relationships among the
attributes and their effects on loan desirability are complex as shown in
Equation 5i An important question, therefore, in the analysis of the loan
evaluation process concerns the relative effects of various criteria on the
loan application and the degree to which tradeoffs are made among criteria by
the loan officer.
Due to the complexity of the lender's expected utility function (2), it is
not possible to estimate it directly. Consequently, an appropriate methodology
used in this study is conjoint measurement, which concerns the modeling of
utility-based decisions. Conjoint measurement procedures are designed to decom
pose an individual's utility responses (5) to multiattribute stimuli so that the
effects of stimulus attributes on the ultimate decision can be analyzed.^
The development of the critical decision variables, as specified in Sec
tion II, was based on existing literature and interviews with senior lending
8personnel. These variables and their respective treatment levels are shown in
Table 1. Previous empirical research (Altman, Schlosser, and Vernommen [2],
Harris [15], Hester [18], James [20], Luckett [25], Sealey [28]) has relied on
proxies from reported financial data for these variables.
Industries that have exhibited a vulnerability to cyclical fluctuations in
demand are likely to be less attractive to the lender than those with greater
stability. Loan purpose also exerts an influence on the evaluation process.
Harris [15] noted that banks may impose higher priorities for those customers
who have the most "legitimate need for credit." Banks maintain both external
and internal loan policies. A typical external policy is to focus oi economi
cally productive loans which promote growth and viability to the bank's market
area. This external goal is supplemented by internal objectives which include
the generation of a loan portfolio that is not only profitable but also is
consistent with the bank's overall strategy. Since banks are not observed to be
single period profit maximizers, a productive loan can be considered as one in
which a long-term profitable relationship with a borrowing customer is estab
lished or maintained.
Repayment of principal is defined in terras of the ability of the borrowing
firm to meet its debt service requirements which include both interest and
principal. Specific repayment alternatives are more likely affected by the
nature of the firm's financing need. The many alternative borrowing firm
situations are difficult to assess effectively and hence are not tested in this
study. For example, the wide range of loan structure options such as demand
notes, revolving lines of credit, and term debt, preclude active consideration
of each given the constraints of the study's fractional factorial design.
Therefore, a more general definition is employed.
9All-in-yield terms, which include both the base rate and compensating bal
ances, and required collateral compose the pricing component of the decision
process. According to Baltensperger [4], compensating balances may be consid-
2
ered as part of the loan-price vector. In contrast to Bartter and Rendleman
[5], only variable rate pricing tied to the prime rate is considered in this
study. Finally, the excess of the market value of pledged security over the
loan amount, coupled with the liquidity of the collateral, determines the
lender's margin of safety in case of default. Attractive collateral must first
be liquidated quickly without depressing prices. In addition, the greater the
fluctuation in its market value, the less desirable is collateral to the lender.
Therefore, preference would be for greater liquidity and certainty of value.
Each attribute was measured on three levels, resulting in a total of 27
3
combinations based on a fractional factorial design [IJ. The fractional
factorial design was constructed so that all two-way interaction effects among
price, management, and collateral could be estimated. The remaining interaction
terms were confounded.
The six-attribute preference model related to the fractional factorial
design is as follows:
U =X + M+I+P+R+C+Y + MY+MC+YC (7)
miprcy m i p r c ymy mc yc
where:
U « overall utility the respondent derives from the alternative that
^ ^ is characterized as having levels m, i, p, r, c, y for attributes
M (management), I (industry market conditions), P (loan purpose),
R (repayment), C (collateral), and Y (all-in'-yield pricing).
X = mean utility of the set of alternatives
= main part-worth of level m of variable M
I^ = main part-worth of level i of variable I
10
Pp = main part-worth of level p of variable I
= main part-worth of level r of variable R
C = main part-worth of level c of variable C
c
= main part-worth of level y of variable Y
MY « M by Y interaction part-worth
m y ra y ^
M C = M by C interaction part-worth
m c ra c
YyCc = Yy by Cj. interaction part-worth
OLS regression with effects coding, which is similar to dummy variable
regression procedures for conjoint analysis, has been described in detail by
4
Moore [26]. For each attribute, coded vectors similar to dummy variables are
formed except that the coding is 1,0, —!• For each coded vector, category
membership is identified by assigning I's with all others (except the last
category) being assigned O's. The last category is assigned -I's, Since each
factor has 3 levels in this study, 2 effect coded vectors are used to represent
each factor.
The regression equation corresponding to the conjoint measurement model in
equation (7) is:
12
^ ^ + l'=l ^=^1 + ^5^2=^9 + ^6VlO + ^17^1^11 +
®20*2*12 ®2lS'^ ll ^22*9^12 ®23'^ lo'^ ll
^24^10^12
where 3^ = X (the mean utility of the set of alternatives) and the x's represent
the treatment effects of the effects coded attributes.^
Using effects coding, 6^ in equation (8) equals the grand mean of the
dependent variable. Each of the slope variables is equal to the deviation from
uthe mean of the group assigned I's in the vector with which it relates to the
grand mean. Therefore, each of these coefficients reflects a treatment effect
or part-worth. Due to the need to use a fractional factorial design, the tested
Interaction effects in equation (7) were among the yield and collateral terms
and the management variable as a summary measure of the credit consideration.
To test whether non-zero interactions are sufficiently large to be attributed
to other than random fluctuation is determined by using the standard hierarchi
cal F-test of the significance of the increase in due to the inclusion of
the interaction terms in the estimate. If the increment over the main effects
component of the model in the proportion of variance accounted for by the inter
action is not significant, it is sufficient to examine the main effects.
Based on the interaction effects, this study further tests the degree of
interaction between the creditworthiness of the borrowing company and the pric
ing and collateral decisions. Specifically, the dependency of the pricing and
collateral decisions on the level of management ability, as a proxy for the
borrower's creditworthiness, is tested. Finally, the interaction effect of
yield and collateral is examined to assess the nature of the pricing component.
IV. Empirical Analysis
A, Sample and Measurement Procedure
A total of 142 commercial lending officers from 58 banks of varying size
and location were selected to participate in this study.^ The tests were con
ducted by mailing the card deck representing the 27 loan situations to each of
the loan officers along with instructions regarding the required task, A usable
sample of 119 responses was obtained.^ The following procedures were used in
the initial test:
12
1. All 142 subjects were given a deck of 27 cards containing descriptions
of hypothetical loans in terns of the six attributes. The descrip
tions, which were based upon the fractional factorial design, were
identical for all subjects.
2. The frame of reference to be used was that an application for a commer
cial loan was being considered.
3. The subjects were told that the loans differed only with respect to the
6 attributes and were identical in all other factors.
4. The subjects were instructed to sort the cards in order of preference
from the most preferred loan situation to the least preferred loan
situation. Standard sorting instructions were given to the subjects.
As noted in instruction 3, all other aspects of the lending decision are
i
held constant. Based on previous research, these other conditions include loan
size, maturity, bank portfolio conditions, and whether the commercial borrowers
were existing versus new customers.
B. Aggregate Results
Based on equation (7), OLS regression was used to estimate the aggregate
utility model. These pooled regression results are presented in Table 2. With
an of .747, the explanatory results indicate a highly acceptable amount
of homogeneity among the participants. All of the main effects coefficients
are significant at the ,01 level. Furthermore, while the interactions among
the collateral-price and management-price are marginally statistically signifi-
2
cant, they add very little to the total R (increased by only .006). Conse
quently, only the main effects are interpreted and discussed.
Using the coefficients for equation (8), the part-worths of equation (7)
can be calculated. Table 3 shows the resulting part-worths and aggregate
utility functions. Both the relative magnitude and direction of the aggregate
functions can be observed.®
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The dlreccion of the utility functions are consistent with expectations as
specified in Section II. The preference is for high character and ability in
the borrowing firm's management. However, it appears that poor management has
a slightly greater negative Influence on the loan decision than the converse
effect of good management. In terms of industry market conditions, stability
is preferred. The positive and negative influences appear to be equally weight
ed. With respect to loan purpose, a highly productive loan in full compliance
with the bank's loan policy is preferred. Loans which are not productive and
in possible violation of policy weigh more heavily than the opposite effect of
favorable loans in this criterion. The participating loan officers also favored
loans with a more assured secondary repayment source. Again, the evidence indi
cates that a lack of repayment assurance would more likely cause a loan officer
to reject the application than, conversely, a strong repayment assurance would
cause its acceptance. In the first of the pricing variables, greater liquidity
and certainty of value in collateral is preferred. Consistent with the previous
credit variables, the negative implications of collateral appear to be more
important. Finally, a higher spread over prime is preferred. •
The results suggest that the participating lending officers tended to weigh
more heavily the negative influence of the above decision variables. While the
rationale for this result is uncertain, several reasons can be suggested. First,
loan officers reflect the bank's strategy of being cost effective. Typically,
the default of a major loan is more costly than the opportunity cost of denying
a good loan. Less obvious, but probably equally as important, career rewards
and penalties may be asymmetrically biased toward the avoidance of problem
loans. If so, the loan officer would attempt to avoid mistakes even though
possibly excellent loan prospects may be denied. Third, given the limited
return for loans tied only to a debt rate, the officer must find a means to
reject loan applications; thus, a negative variable takes on additional impor
tance. Fourth, as Arnold [3] notes, there is an optimal strategy for the com
mercial borrower to present his or her case before the loan officer. Therefore,
given that a majority of the information is positive, a negative factor takes on
added importance. Finally, a good amount of commercial loan officers* experi
ence and training focuses on avoiding non-productive loans. In essence, they
are likely to be criticized for loans that turn bad which may enforce a better
understanding of denying loan applications than accepting them. While these
reasons have not been empirically validated, they are consistent with the role
of negative information in the management literature.
The range of the part-worths for each attribute can be interpreted as an
index of the relative importance of the attribute as a determinant of the
utility of the stimuli. Examination of the part-worth ranges in Table 2 indi
cates the management variable is the most important attribute although it is
not dominant. Repayment assurance and collateral are next in the influencing
of the preference of the loan officers for specific credit situations. Both
loan policy and yield are. considerably less important. In the case of yield,
a combination of reasons is plausible. First, given the influence of variables
such as management capability and repayment assurance as well as coii5>etition
with other financial institutions, it could become a foregone conclusion.
Second, the range of yield alternatives is quite narrow given the set of alter
native combinations of other variables. The importance of yield may have been
more significant if the range of spreads over prime had been larger. However,
competition among financial institutions tends to limit this range.
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The magnitude of the part-worths illustrates that the influence of poor
management can be offset by high repayment assurance and collateral. However,
conversely, excellent management is not enough to compensate for insufficient
evidence of good repayment ability and collateral. The nature of these rela
tionships further confirms the lack of importance of pricing in this decision
process. The role of yield has little influence on the outcome of individual
decision processes.
Luckett [25] concluded that, since loan rates tend to be sticky, banks will
adapt to tight money by establishing an ordering system with nonprice variables.
This compares with the findings of Harris 115] that banks ration capital based
on both interest rate (and compensating balance requirements) and non-price
variables. Baltensperger [4] raised the issue of the relative roles of adjust
ing the interest rate charged or the non-interest terms of the loan contract to
reflect the rationing of credit. Further research suggests that, given sticky
interest rates, the allocative efficiency of the capital markets would be re
duced unless non-interest loan terms were allowed to play a role in the allocat
ing of funds. The results of this study provide evidence that the non-interest
loan terras appear to have a stronger and more consistent effect on the loan
decision.
C. Subsample Analysis
The possibility of differences in utility functions among subsets of loan
officers was investigated by comparing subsamples of respondents' utility func
tions. Both individual and lending environment variables were tested. In the
latter category, the Herfindahl Index was employed to measure the effect of
market concentration. Within subject analysis was used to obtain an individual
?• 16
utility function for each respondent. While the methodology was identical to
that used earlier in the pooled estimate, the measurement derives a unique set
of part-worths for each lending officer. Part-worth ranges were then calculated
for each of the attributes listed in Table 1.
MultiVariate analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis of
no signifibant differences in part-worth importance score vectors for the sub-
samples noted in Table 3. Only lending experience was significant, iliose lend
ing officers with high experience exhibited different factor importance range
vectors than those with low experience. A univariate analysis, comparing the
two groups-' importance indices, is reported in Table 4. Statistically signifi-
I 1
cant differences were found for the collateral and price attributes. The low
experience' group attached more importance to collateral and less to the yield
attribute.} In spite of these significant differences, the two groups' rank
order of importance for the decision variables in Table 1 were very similar.
These subs.ample comparisons indicate that considerable homogeneity exists among
the indivi'dual utility functions. Consequently, the pooling of the responses
for.aggregate analysis was justified.
V. Summary
This study has empirically examined the decision process of the individual
commercial' lending officer. The principal objective has been to expand on pre
vious repqarch which has focused on either commercial lending in the context of
bank portfolio allocation models or on a limited view of loan pricing. Further
more, by (Concentrating on hypothetical loans, major limitations of previous
empirical^research have been avoided. After developing a multiattribute utility
17
function for the connnercial loan officer, conjoint analysis was employed to
examine the relative effects of the specified criteria on this process. The
model exhibited not only a high degree of explanatory power but also an accept
able level of predictive validity. The main effects components dominated the
model's explanatory power with all of the variables being significant and exhib
iting the expected signs.
Based on the sample of this study, commercial lending officers are rela
tively homogeneous in"terms of the respective decision criteria. The relative
importance of these criteria was measured with the assessment of management and
yield being the most important and least important, respectively. It also
appears that the a priori inclinations of loan officers is to deny the loan.
With the exception of industry market conditions and yield, the negative influ
ence of the decision variables was prevalent. Several possible reasons for such'
a tendency were presented but, again, this highlights the potential for more
research in this field. In essence, constrained by a maximum acceptable pricing
level, creditworthiness of the firm and the liquidity of its collateral had a
greater effect on the loan decision. The aggregate utility function suggests
that additional research may be worthwhile on the role of loan pricing in the
context of the other decision variables.
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Footnotes
1. Recent empirical research indicates conjoint measurements are characterized
by high predictive utility and measurement stability ([131,[14],[19],126]).
2. The thrust of existing literature focuses on the rationality of compensating
balances, with rationality defined as the relationship between the bank's
interest income and the cost to the borrowing firm. Much of the conclusions
as to whether compensating balances are rational depends on the assumptions
regarding how the required balances are determined and the options available
to the borrowing firm. Kolodny et al. [23] suggest that the rationality
question must be resolved by examining the proportion of the borrowing firm's
financing requirements which are held as voluntary balances.
This study does not directly address this issue. The underlying assumption
is that the loan pricing reflects a risk equivalent combination of rate and
balances. For example, Cramer and Sterk [10] note that a multiperlod pric
ing formula should be employed which allows for the present value of future
Income derived from expected balances when determining the base loan rate.
3. A fractional factorial design was necessary to make the number of treatment
combinations small enough to be manageable. A full factorial design would
have consisted of 3^ or 729 combinations.
The loan officers' preference ratings consisted of rank order judgments.
The dependent variable, therefore, was measured on an ordinal scale. Recent
evidence [19] indicates metric analysis of variance or ordinary least squares
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(OLS) regression procedures are robust in conjoint measurement applications.
Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis using effects
coding was used to estimate the part-worth functions in this study.
4. As recommended by Cohen and Cohen [9] and others (Blora [6], Tukey [30]), the
rank order data for the dependent variable were normalized by means of a
•probit transformation. This transformation results in the rectangular rank
order frequency distribution being converted to a more bell-shaped frequency
distribution. The probit transformation equation used was (Blom [6]):
R. - 3/8
P = -1 ^
n + 1/A
where:
Pj^ = Probit transformation of the i^^ rank
= Inverse cumulative normal function
= The i^^ rank with 27 representing the first choice
n = Number of stimuli ranked (n»27)
5. The variables x. through are defined as follows:
X = M X = P X C
X2=M3 x, =P3 x^„=C3
P P Z _^2
^4 3 8 3 12 3
The treatment combinations are effect coded which results in two coded
vectors per attribute. For example, and X2 are used to reflect the
M treatment levels where:
Xj^ = 0 and x^ = 1 to represent treatment level,
x^ = 1 and X2 = 0 to represent M2 treatment level.
x^ = -1 and X2 = -1 to represent treatment level.
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6. The banks represented in this study are located in the midwestern states.
Both metropolitan and rural banks were included to permit analysis of this
location impact. However, no significant differences in the decision proc
ess werevfound.
7. In pooled conjoint measurement, the response data are pooled across respond
ents and'one aggregate utility estimate is obtained. If all the respondents
evaluate identical stimulus objects, this pooled estimate can be interpreted
as an average utility estimate for the group. A potential shortcoming of
this procedure, however, is the "majority fallacy" [24], which is caused by
heterogeneity of individual responses. However, when the group to be aggre
gated is ^relatively homogeneous, the predictive validity problem is reduced
considerably (Moore [26]Since the primary purpose of this study involves
the question of how commercial lending officers in general evaluate loan
applications, and since this group represents a relatively homogeneous group
of decision makers, aggregate conjoint analysis procedures were used. The
question of a potential "majority fallacy" was examined by evaluating the
coefficient of determination of the estimate, by testing the predictive
validity'Of the model for a sub-group of the respondents, and by examining
subsample multiattribute utility function differences.
8. The predictive validity of the model was tested by using the aggregate model
to calculate predicted utilities (predicted prbbit values) of the nine stimu
lus profiles ranked by each respondent in the re-test. For each individual,
these predicted utilities were correlated with the actual utilities (actual
probit values were calculated by assuming the top ranked card had an ordinal
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value of 27). The average of the 23 correlation coefficients, which was
calculated using standard Z-transformation procedures, was .645. This
result compares favorably with previous research concerning the predictive
validity of multlattrlbute models (Moore [26]).
Appendix
Recall (A),
1+r-c
E(R/Z) = / U(c+x)f(x/Z)dx + U(l+r)[l-F(l+r-c/Z)l,
0
In this appendix, we compute the derivatives of (A), namely —*
3E(R/Z), 3E(R/Z)^ integrating the first term on the right-hand side of (4)
9 c 9 2^
by parts, we have
l+r-c 1+r-c
E(R/Z)- « U(c+ic)F(x/Z) - / ^F(x/Z)dx +U(14t) [l-F(l-h:-c/Z) ].
0 0 ^
This simplifies to
1+r-c g
E(R/Z)- « U(l+r) - / ^(x/Z)dx.
0
since F(0/Z) = 0.
Now differentiating with respect to c, we have
0 C O x
= i^ltijE2.F(l+r-c/Z)>0,
oX
since utility is increasing and there is some probability of non-performance.
Next differentiating with respect to r, we have
3E^ . [l-F(l+r-c/Z)]>0.
or ox ox ox
Finally, differentiating with respect to one of the 2^*s, we have
3E(R/Z) _ 3u 3F(x/Z),_.,„ 3F(x/Z)<0.
-3^7- \ 37 3dz^ Sz-
An increase in reduces the cumulative probability of any point Xq, as
probability mass is shifted towards higher values .of x.
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Table 1
Decision Variables for Commercial Lending Model
1. Borrowing Company's Management
High Character and Ability
Average Character and Ability
Low Character and Ability
2. Industry Market Conditions
High Rate of Change
Average Rate of Change
Low Rate of Change
3. Loan Purpose
Highly :Productive Loan—Full Compliance with Loan Policy
Average Productive Loan—Full Compliance with Loan Policy
Speculative Loan—Marginal Compliance with Loan Policy
4. Repayment
Highly Assured Source of Repayment—Good Track Record
Average Assurance of Source of Repayment—Average Track Record
Uncertain Source~of Repayment—No Track Record
5. Collateral
Highly ..Liquid with Certain Value
Average Liquidity and Average Certainty of Value
Illiquid and Uncertain Value
6. Pricing (all in yield)
Prime Plus 4 Points
Prime Plus 2 Points
Prime ,,
Table 2
Multiple Regression Results Using Effects Coding
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Explanatory Variables Sum of Squares Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Squares F
Management
Xi
X2 1016.61754 2 508.30875 2203.81®
Industry
*3
31.7905 2 15,89525 68.92^
Purpose
X5
X6 633.0343 2 316.51715 1372.28®
Repayment
*7
X8 608.4619 2 304.23095 1319.02®'
it Collateral
X9
XlO 287.7597 2 143.87985 623.80®
Price
xn
^12 33.3965 2 16.69825 72.40®
r2 = .747
^p < .01
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Table 3: Part-Worth Estimates
Equatlon(8)
Explanatory
Variables
Partial
Regression
Coefficient
MAIN
t
EFFECTS
Part-Worths^
Part-Worth
Range
Importance
• Rank
Management
Variables
.160
.600
13.362^
49.694^
-.760(Mp
.160(M )
,600(M3) 1.360 1
Industry
Variables
^3 .005
.119
0.396
9.961^
-.124(1 )
.oo5(in
.119(13) 0.243 5
Purpose
Variables
X
H
/
.145
.190
12.09^
15.847®
-.335(P,)
.145(P')
.190(P3) 0.525 4
Repayment
Variables
h
\
.074
.491
6.189®
41,010®
-.565(R,)
.074(r')
.491(R3) 1.056 2
Collateral
Variables
=^9
^10
.074
.324
6.136®
27.086®
-.398(C,)
.074(C)
.324(03) 0.722 3
Yield
Variables
^11
=^12
.051
,092
4.253®
7.604®
-.143(Y )
.051(Y )
.092(Y3) 0.235 6
< .01
bp < .05
^Part'-Worth Values: The part-worth values corresponding levels two and three
of each attribute are equal to the partial regression coefficients correspond
ing to each of those attribute levels. The part-worth values for the level
one of each attribute are calculated as follows: M.=-(M«+M^); I =-(I«+I«);
Pl=-(P2+P3); Ri=-(R2+R3); Ci=-(C2-K:3); Yi=-(Y2+Y3)/ ^ ^ ^ ^
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Table h
Multivariate F Tests: Differences Among
Groups' Importance Indices (Part-Worth Ranges)
Criteria for Multivariate F
Group Comparison
Individual Characteristics
Age^ 1.220
Banking Experience^ 2.388*^
Commercial Loan Experience® 1.093
Employment with Current Employer® 1.A46
Lending Environment
Average Loan Size^ 0.825
Bank Size: Total Deposits^ 0.327
Herfindahl Index® 1.190
^Two groups formed by dividing the total group of respondents
at the median value.
^Three groups formed with approximately 33 percent of the
respondents in each group.
-p<.05
Table 5
Univariate F Tests: Comparisons of Importance
Indices for the Low Banking Experience Group vs. the
High Banking Experience Group
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Loan
Decision
Factors
Low
Experience
Group Means
Iligh
Experience
Group Means
IJnivariate
F
Significance
of F
Management 1.35 1.37 0.080 .778
Industry
Conditions 0.31 0.35 1.012 .316
Loan Purpose 0.80 0.58 0.000
1.000
Repayment 1.10 1.03 0.934 -336
Collateral 0.79 0.68 4.316
.040
Pricing 0.25 0.37 9.000 .003
